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1 Introduction 
In a market-based economy, those who create and manage firms 
(entrepreneurs) are usually not the same individuals as those who have 
the means to finance this activity. This fact implies that there is likely to 
exist an information gap between those asking for funds and those 
supplying them. As will be discussed in more detail below, economists 
refer to the extra costs thus induced as arising from the problems of 
“asymmetric-information” and “moral-hazard”. Both of these are expected 
to raise the costs of obtaining finance from sources external to the firm. 
And although this will be true to some extent for all firms, the problem is 
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particularly salient in the case of new firms and firms undertaking 
innovative activities. 
Three different levels of difficulty need to be distinguished: the 
problems of existing innovating firms in acquiring sufficient funds for 
their investments, the reluctance of non-innovators to undertake 
innovation due to its high cost, and the problems faced by new start-up 
firms. Although all of these difficulties arise from the same ultimate set of 
causes, the empirical analysis of each will differ substantially and the 
possible range of policy solutions will differ. In particular, the first case, on 
which most of the econometric literature has focused, is subject to 
marginal analysis, whereas the second two cases involve the overcoming 
of (often substantial) fixed costs of entry into innovation.  
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical economic literature on 
the financing of innovation and draws some conclusions with respect to 
policy designed to ameliorate some of the problems1. Section 2 of the 
paper discusses the characteristics that make innovation investment 
different from ordinary investment. Then the theories of asymmetric-
information and moral-hazard as applied to financing innovation are 
reviewed, followed by a summary of the empirical evidence on this topic. 
The concluding section discusses implications for public policy.  
2 Why is Investment in Innovation Different? 
Investment in innovation usually consists of Research and 
Development spending (R&D), design and marketing expenses for 
bringing a new product to market, investment in the necessary new capital 
equipment, and investment in training2. The relative importance of each of 
this varies with the industry and type of innovation, although the most 
important spending in most sectors is R&D, accounting for more than 
50 percent of innovation expenditures.  
From the perspective of investment theory, innovation investments 
have a number of characteristics that make them different from ordinary 
investment. First and most importantly, most of the expenditures, with the 
exception of those on new capital equipment, consist of worker wages and 
salaries. From considerable survey evidence over the past 50 years, we 
know that in practice 50 percent or more of the R&D portion of this 
                                                 
1 The paper draws from – and updates – an earlier survey (Hall, 2002). 
2 For example, the European Community Innovation Survey Wave 4 (CIS4) asks whether 
the firm has the following types of innovation expenses: 1) internal R&D; 2) external 
R&D; 3) acquisition of new capital equipment or software; 4) acquisition of external 
knowledge or know-how including licenses, IP rights, etc.; 5) training; 6) marketing; and 
7) other expenses associated with launching new products or processes, such as design 
and engineering. 
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investment goes toward paying scientists and engineers, who are usually 
highly educated. Their efforts create an intangible asset, the firm’s 
knowledge base, from which profits in future years will be generated. 
Added to this knowledge base is the specific human capital created by 
worker training in new products and processes and the knowledge 
created by design and marketing investments. To the extent that all this 
knowledge is “tacit” rather than codified, it is embedded in the human 
capital of the firm’s employees, and is therefore lost if they leave or are 
fired.  
This fact has an important implication for the conduct of R&D 
investment and to a lesser extent, innovation investment more broadly. 
The focus in the discussion below is on R&D as it is the measure on which 
empirical research has usually been based. Because part of the resource 
base of the firm itself disappears when knowledge workers leave or are 
fired, firms tend to smooth their R&D spending over time, in order to 
avoid having to lay them off. This implies that R&D spending at the firm 
level will behave as though it has high adjustment costs (confirmed 
empirically for the US by Hall et al., 1986; Lach and Schankerman, 1988), 
with two consequences, one substantive and one that affects empirical 
work in this area. First, the equilibrium required rate of return to R&D 
may be quite high simply to cover the adjustment costs. Second, and 
related to the first, is that it will be difficult for empirical studies to 
measure the impact of changes in the costs of capital on such investment, 
because such effects can be weak in the short run due to the sluggish 
response of R&D to any changes in its cost.  
The above conclusion needs to be tempered somewhat by the 
observation that in the recent past, the variance of R&D spending growth 
in publicly traded US firms has increased somewhat, for at least two 
reasons. The first is the increased importance of the ICT sector, where 
there is fairly rapid obsolescence of R&D outputs, and a consequent 
reduction in the incentives to safeguard human capital (Hall 2006). The 
second is that markets for technology have become somewhat more 
important, which reduces the need to keep firm’s entire knowledge in-
house (Arora et al., 2001). Nonetheless, it remains true that the variance in 
R&D investment growth rates is about one quarter to one fifth that for 
ordinary investment.  
A second important feature of R&D investment is the degree of 
uncertainty associated with its output. This uncertainty tends to be 
greatest at the beginning of a research program or project, which implies 
that an optimal R&D strategy has an options-like character and should not 
really be analyzed in a static framework. R&D projects with small 
probabilities of great success in the future may be worth continuing even 
if they do not pass an expected rate of return test. The uncertainty here can 
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be extreme and not a simple matter of a well-specified distribution with a 
mean and variance. There is evidence such as that in Scherer (1998) that 
the distribution of profits from innovation sometimes takes the form of a 
Pareto distribution where the variance does not exist3. When this is the 
case, standard risk-adjustment methods will not work well. Looked at 
from the perspective of standard finance theory, the variance of a portfolio 
constructed from such assets is unbounded so the usual diversification 
analysis does not apply.  
High uncertainty of returns to innovation has been exacerbated in the 
recent past by the rise of network, or “winner-take-all” industries, such as 
software or Web-based services. Examples such as Microsoft, Goggle, 
Yahoo, eBay, and now Facebook are familiar – these are characterized by 
very high returns to the initial investment, but there are a number of 
similar entrants who either fail or never reach critical mass and settle for a 
small niche of the market. In fact, the high returns experienced by a few 
firms do succeed in attracting a number of entrants, but there is no 
guarantee that it is the “right” number. 
An important characteristic of uncertainty for the financing of 
investment in innovation is the fact that as investments are made over 
time, new information arrives, which reduces or changes the uncertainty. 
The consequence of this fact is that the decision to invest in any particular 
project is not a once and for all decision, but has to be reassessed 
throughout the life of the project. In addition to making such investment a 
real option, the sequence of decisions complicates the analysis by 
introducing dynamic elements into the interaction of the financier (either 
within or without the firm) and the innovator.  
The final characteristic of R&D as investment that has implications for 
financing is tha the “capital” thus created is intangible. Not only is it 
intangible, but as discussed above, much of it is in the form of human 
capital embedded in the heads of the employees. Such capital typically has 
relatively low salvage value because it is also idiosyncratic – for example, 
the fact that the firm owning the capital goes out of business is a signal 
that its value turned out to be low. Except for the type of effort now 
underway to harvest patents from such firms (e.g., Ocean Tomo or 
Intellectual Ventures), there is little market for distressed intangible assets. 
The human capital involved goes with the employee, and usually he or 
she will capture any residual value from that in the form of wages in 
future employment. Thus debt instruments that are secured by the value 
of the capital asset are not likely to provide a useful source of funding for 
                                                 
3 The simplest Pareto distribution is a one-parameter probability distribution with the 
property that under certain values of the parameter the variance of the outcomes drawn 
according to such a distribution is infinitely large. 
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R&D. See Harhoff (2009) for a description of recent efforts to change this 
situation via the creation of patent funds for the commercial exploitation 
of unused inventions.  
Summarizing, R&D and other innovation investments have the 
following characteristics: (i) they need to be smoothed in order to retain 
valuable employees and their knowledge; (ii) they are highly uncertain 
and information about success or failure is revealed over time; and (iii) 
they create an idiosyncratic intangible capital with a limited resale market. 
The next section of the paper reviews the theory of investment in the light 
of these characteristics and discusses the implications of the theory for the 
financing of innovation.  
3 Theoretical Framework: Is Finance Different for 
Innovative Firms? 
What follows focuses on the analysis of ongoing innovative firms rather 
than new start-ups. The greater part of empirical work has been 
performed using data on these kinds of firms, partly because they perform 
the great bulk of R&D and partly due to data availability4. The start-up 
problem will be discussed later in the paper.  
The usual starting point for the analysis of any type of investment 
financing is the “neo-classical” marginal profit condition, suitably 
modified to take the special features of R&D into account. This condition 
sets the marginal product of capital equal to the rate of return on 
investment in that capital. Ignoring adjustment costs and uncertainty for 
the moment, the discrete time cost-of-capital condition is the following: 
 
1
)1(
)1(
ttt ppcMPK  
(1) 
 
That is, the marginal product of capital (MPK) that is used during 
period t is equal to its price less what the firm would receive from selling 
the capital at t+1 (which is (1- ) pt+1), discounted by the required rate of 
return .  is the return received by the investor, which is after corporate 
taxes are paid but before any personal or capital gains taxes are paid.  
The above formulation implicitly contains three factors that will affect 
R&D financing: the rate at which the knowledge capital thus created 
depreciates or becomes obsolescent, the required rate of return, and rate of 
change of the real R&D price (the price of R&D inputs relative to the price 
                                                 
4 Firms with more than 250 employees account for 90 percent of R&D worldwide (OECD, 
2007).  
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of the firm’s output). It is obvious that higher depreciation rates increase 
the cost of capital, while lower post-corporate-tax required returns, as in 
the case of an R&D tax credit, would lower it. In addition, if R&D is 
expected to become relatively more expensive tomorrow (pt+1 > pt), this 
lowers the cost of capital today but this effect is relatively small in 
practice.  
The required rate of return in the equation above is the return after 
corporate taxes have been paid. However, as Auerbach (1984), among 
others, has shown, the marginal source of financing used by the firm will 
also impact the required rate of return that a prospective investor 
perceives. He analyzed the US case, where interest expense is deductible 
to the corporation, and the tax on capital gains has generally been lower 
than that on dividends. The same type of analysis would apply whenever 
profits from longer holding periods are taxed at a lower rate than those 
from shorter holding periods. The table below shows the cost of financing 
based on source of finance that he derived; in general, tax considerations 
suggest that debt finance will be cheapest, followed by retained earnings, 
and lastly by new share issues.  
 
Table 1 - Tax-Adjusted Financing Cost 
Source of 
finance 
Cost of finance Assumptions 
Debt ρ (1- ) Interest is deductible at the corporate level 
Retained 
earnings 
ρ (1- p)/(1- c) Avoids personal tax on dividends in favour of eventual 
capital gains tax 
New share 
issues 
ρ /(1- c) Eventual capital gains tax paid 
ρ= required return;  = corporate tax rate; p = personal tax rate;   c = capital-gains tax rate 
Source: Auerbach (1984). 
 
Obviously the story does not end here. Implicitly in constructing this 
table I have assumed that there is a single risk-adjusted rate of return 
available, but we have already seen that this is unlikely to be true, given 
the degree of uncertainty faced by innovating firms. That is, some 
innovation investments are so risky that a simple risk-adjustment based 
on the variance of returns is not available. In addition, different types of 
investors are likely to prefer different risk profiles. Bondholders will care 
more about salvage value (which also favours tangible over intangible 
assets), whereas equity holders may see an unbounded upside to the 
returns and may therefore prefer risk.  
Two other major reasons for differences in the required rate of return 
across financing source have been the subject of considerable theoretical 
and empirical interest, on the part of both industrial organization and 
corporate finance economists: asymmetric-information and moral-hazard. 
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These factors are widely viewed as driving a wedge between the cost of 
internal and external sources of finance, a wedge that is likely to be larger 
in the case of innovation investment than it is for ordinary investment. 
One of the implications of the well-known Modigliani-Miller theorem 
(1958, 1961) was that a firm choosing the optimal levels of investment 
should be indifferent to its capital structure, and should face the same 
price for all types of investment (including investments in creating new 
products and processes) on the margin. The last dollar spent on each type 
of investment should yield the same expected rate of return (after 
adjustment for non-diversifiable risk). A large literature, both theoretical 
and empirical, has questioned the bases for this theorem, but it remains a 
useful starting point.  
Of course, there are a number of reasons why the theorem might fail to 
hold in practice. First, uncertain returns in combination with incomplete 
markets imply that insurance over all outcomes is not available. Second, 
the cost of capital may vary across the source of the funds either for non-
tax reasons or for tax reasons. Finally, the cost of capital may also vary 
across type of investment (tangible and intangible) both for tax and for 
other reasons.  
Summing up, with respect to innovation investment, economic theory 
advances a plethora of reasons why there might be a gap between the 
external and internal costs of capital; these can be divided into three main 
types, of which the first two arise from market failures: (i) asymmetric-
information between innovator and investor; (ii) moral-hazard arising 
from the separation of ownership and management; and (iii) tax 
considerations that drive a wedge between external and internal finance. 
The following three sections treat each of these in turn.  
3.1 Asymmetric-Information Problems 
In the R&D setting, the asymmetric-information problem refers to the 
fact that an inventor or entrepreneur frequently has better information 
about the nature of the contemplated innovation project and the likelihood 
of its success than potential investors. Therefore the marketplace for 
financing the development of innovative ideas looks like the “lemons” 
market modelled by Akerlof (1970). In his model, the good (used) cars 
sells for a lower price in order to compensate the buyer for the possibility 
that the car is a lemon. In this setting, the seller of potential returns to 
R&D or innovation offers a higher return (lower price) to compensate the 
buyer for the possibility that the project is not as good as is claimed. The 
lemons' premium for R&D or innovation will be higher than that for 
ordinary investment because investors have more difficulty distinguishing 
good projects from bad when the projects are long-term R&D investments 
Bronwyn H. Hall: The Financing of Innovative Firms 
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than when they are short-term or low-risk projects (Leland and Pyle, 
1977). 
In the most extreme version of the lemons model, the market for R&D 
projects may disappear entirely if the asymmetric-information problem is 
too great. Informal evidence suggests that some potential innovators 
believe this to be the case in practice. Reducing information asymmetry 
via fuller disclosure is of limited effectiveness in this arena, due to the ease 
of imitation of inventive ideas. Firms are reluctant to reveal their 
innovative ideas to the marketplace and the fact that there could be a 
substantial cost to revealing information to their competitors reduces the 
quality of the signal they can make about a potential project (Bhattacharya 
and Ritter, 1983; Anton and Yao, 1998). Thus the implication of 
asymmetric-information coupled with the costliness of mitigating the 
problem is that firms and inventors will face a higher cost of external than 
internal capital for R&D due to the lemons’ premium. When the level of 
R&D expenditure is an observable signal subject to external audit, as it is 
under current accounting rules in several countries, we might expect that 
the lemons' problem is somewhat mitigated, but certainly not eliminated. 
Asymmetric-information problems can sometimes be mitigated by 
reputations developed through repeated interactions and this setting is no 
exception. There are several forms of reputation-building observed. One of 
the important roles played by specialized Venture Capital (VC) funds is 
precisely to supply informed monitoring of early stage technology start-
ups, but experienced VCs will also have developed a reputation for 
honouring nondisclosure agreements that will enable them to gather 
better information about projects being proposed. On the other side of the 
transaction, serial entrepreneurs often face less difficulty in obtaining 
financing for new ventures, presumably because they have developed a 
reputation in prior start-ups. 
3.2 Moral-Hazard Problems 
Moral-hazard in R&D investing arises in the usual way: modern 
industrial firms normally have separation of ownership and management. 
This leads to a principal-agent problem when the goals of the two conflict, 
which can result in investment strategies that are not share value 
maximizing, and hence can lead to under or over-investment. Two 
possible scenarios may co-exist: one is the usual tendency of managers to 
spend on activities that benefit them but not necessarily their firm 
(growing the firm beyond efficient scale, nicer offices, etc.) and the second 
is a reluctance of risk-averse managers to invest in uncertain R&D 
projects. 
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Agency costs of the first type may be avoided by reducing the amount 
of free cash flow available to the managers by leveraging the firm, but this 
in turn forces them to use the higher cost external funds to finance R&D 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Empirically, there seem to be limits to the use 
of the leveraging strategy in R&D-intensive sectors. See Hall (1990, 1994) 
for evidence that the leveraged-buyout (LBO) and restructuring wave of 
the 1980s, viewed by most researchers as driven by the need to reduce free 
cash flow in sectors where investment opportunities were poor, was 
almost entirely confined to industries and firms where R&D was of no 
consequence. One reason for this fact may be that over-investment in R&D 
and innovation is not usually a major problem for ongoing managerial 
firms and therefore the discipline of cash-flow limiting leverage is 
unnecessary for restraining these kinds of investment. 
According to the second type of principal-agent conflict, managers are 
more risk averse than shareholders and avoid innovation projects that will 
increase the riskiness of the firm. If bankruptcy is a possibility, managers 
whose next best opportunity is a job with lower compensation than their 
present job and potential bondholders may both wish to avoid variance-
increasing projects that shareholders would like to undertake. The 
argument of the theory is that long-term investments can suffer in this 
case. The optimal solution to this type of agency cost would be to increase 
the long-term incentives faced by the manager rather than reducing free 
cash flow. Many innovative firms make heavy use of stock option 
compensation for this reason, although this solution comes with its own 
incentive problems.  
In the case of start-up firms, there is often a third type of principal-
agent conflict, involving overconfidence on the part of the entrepreneur. 
When there is uncertainty and the probability of innovation success is 
revealed only gradually over time, the possibility of asymmetric-
information and moral-hazard in the investor-innovator relationship 
creates further problems for achieving the optimal contract. For example, 
it is often observed that entrepreneurs or R&D managers wish to continue 
projects that investors would like to terminate (Cornelli and Yosha, 2003), 
presumably because the possibility of an ultimate benefit to the 
entrepreneurs looms large and they do not face the investment cost in the 
case of failure. If they are also over-confident (as is often the case), they 
will be even more biased toward continuation. Asymmetric-information 
about the project will imply that the investor has relatively more difficulty 
than the innovator even in determining the probability of success. The 
combination of information rents and agency costs will lead to inefficient 
funding of projects over time (waiting too long to cancel them or 
cancelling them too soon) as well as to inefficiently low levels of funding.  
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In a recent paper, Bergemann and Hege (2005) have analyzed these 
tradeoffs in a multi-stage investment financing decision under changing 
uncertainty, with renegotiation allowed. They look at the choice between 
relationship financing (where the investor is able to monitor the progress 
of the project accurately) and arm’s length financing (where the investor 
must rely on the innovator for information). Investors are able to speed up 
or slow down the rate of financing, depending on the progress of the 
project and their expectations of success. In general, Bergemann and Hege 
find that agency costs will lead to non-optimal stopping rules for projects, 
stopping them too soon on average. Surprisingly, arm’s length contracts 
can lead to higher project values, because in these the investor can commit 
in advance to a stopping rule, which eliminates any benefit to the 
entrepreneur from attempts to prolong the project.  
3.3 Taxes and the Source of Funds 
As discussed earlier, tax considerations that yield variations in the cost 
of capital across source of finance have been articulated by Auerbach 
(1984) among others. In many tax systems including that in the US, 
interest is deductible against earnings and the proceeds from equity held 
for longer periods is taxed at a lower rate. Therefore the cost of financing 
new investment by debt has been effectively lower than that of financing it 
by retained earnings, which is in turn less than that of issuing new shares5. 
However, based on the discussion above, this ranking of the financing 
costs is unlikely to hold for the intangible assets created by innovation 
investment. Low salvage values relative to the original investment makes 
these assets unsuitable for debt finance in spite of the tax advantage, so 
that firms whose investments are mostly intangible will rely more heavily 
on retained earnings and equity. 
Differential tax treatment not only obtains for the sources of funds but 
also for their use. The specific tax treatment of R&D and other innovation 
investments in most OECD economies is very different from that of other 
kinds of investment. Because R&D, marketing costs, training costs, etc. are 
expensed as they are incurred, the effective tax rate on the corresponding 
assets is lower than that on either plant or equipment, with or without 
various tax credits in place. The economic depreciation of innovation 
assets is considerably less than the depreciation allowed for tax purposes - 
                                                 
5 A detailed discussion of tax regimes in different countries is beyond the scope of this 
survey, but it is quite a common feature in several countries for long term capital gains 
on funds that remain with a firm for more than one year to be taxed at a lower rate than 
ordinary income. Yet even if the tax rates on the two kinds of income are equal, the 
inequalities will hold. Only in the case where dividends are not taxed at the corporate 
level (which was formerly the case in the UK) will the ranking given above not hold.  
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which is 100 percent - so that the required pre-tax rate of return for such 
investment would be lower relative to ordinary investment. In addition, 
some countries offer a tax credit or subsidy to R&D spending and 
occasionally to other activities such as employee training, which can 
reduce the after tax cost of capital even further6.  
Thus the conclusions from the theoretical analysis of firm-level 
investment in innovation is that the presence of either asymmetric-
information or a principal-agent conflict or both implies that new debt or 
equity finance from sources external to the firm will be relatively more 
expensive for R&D and innovation than for ordinary investment, and that 
considerations such as the lack of collateral further reduce the possibility 
of debt finance. Together, these arguments suggest an important role for 
retained earnings in the R&D investment decision. In addition, retained 
earnings may serve as a signal of future profitability. Hall (1992) and 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) have argued that positive cash flow may 
be more important for R&D than for ordinary investment, a proposition 
that has since received empirical support (see Section 4).  
A final important conclusion from the theory above is that whatever 
problems are created for the financing of innovative firms by asymmetric-
information and moral-hazard are likely to be exacerbated in the case of 
young firms and start-ups. These firms are often the most reliant on 
external sources of finance and of course they have not yet developed 
reputations that would allow them to signal their quality adequately. 
Evidence that this is true in practice as well as theory is provided in 
Section 4.5.  
4 Empirical Evidence 
Almost all of the empirical evidence for the presence of a wedge 
between internal and external finance, and the consequent 
underinvestment in innovation that is discussed in this section uses R&D 
investment as a proxy for long term investment or investment in 
innovative activities. There are good reasons for this – R&D is frequently 
the only measure of innovation that has been observed over long time 
periods at the firm level and it is highly related to innovative activities, at 
least in the manufacturing sector. The recent wave of innovation surveys 
in Europe and elsewhere is beginning to provide us with alternative 
measures, although thus far it appears that R&D still has greater 
predictive power for firm performance than the newer measures, at least 
where it is observed (Mairesse et al., 2006). Later in this section some 
results obtained using the innovation surveys will be presented. 
                                                 
6 See Hall and Van Reenen (2000) and Warda (2008) for details.  
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In the discussion below, the empirical studies in this area are divided 
into two groups: those based on variations of an investment equation 
derived from economic theory (Sections 4.1 and 4.2), and other studies – 
mostly financial-market studies based on stock-price announcement 
effects on the impact of various corporate-governance settings on the 
financing of innovation (Section 4.3). The section concludes with a 
discussion of the evidence on the resulting capital structure of innovating 
firms.  
4.1 Investment-Equation Studies 
For a firm already operating, the presence of “liquidity” constraints on 
their investment (ordinary as well as innovation and R&D investment) 
implies that they are unable to obtain funds from external sources to 
finance all the investment that they would undertake if they had sufficient 
funds available within the firm. Thus the usual way to examine the 
empirical relevance of the arguments in the previous section is to estimate 
R&D investment equations and test whether liquidity constraints or excess 
sensitivity to cash-flow shocks are present and perhaps more pronounced 
than for ordinary investment. This approach builds on the extensive 
literature developed for testing ordinary investment equations for 
liquidity constraints (Fazzari et al., 1988; Arellano and Bond, 1991). It 
suffers from many of the same difficulties as the estimates in the 
investment literature (lack of good instruments to isolate supply shocks, 
measurement error, unobserved differences across firms, and so forth), 
plus one additional problem that arises from the tendency of firms to 
smooth R&D spending over time.  
The ideal experiment for identifying the effects of liquidity constraints 
on investment is to give firms additional cash exogenously, and observe 
whether they pass it on to shareholders or use it for investment and/or 
R&D. If they choose the first alternative, either the cost of capital to the 
firm has not fallen, or it has fallen but they still have no good investment 
opportunities. If they choose the second, then the firm must have had 
some unexploited investment opportunities that were not profitable using 
more costly external finance. A finding that investment is sensitive to cash 
flow shocks that are not signals of future demand increases would allow 
rejecting the hypothesis that the cost of external funds is the same as the 
cost of internal funds. However, lack of true experiments of this kind 
forces researchers to use econometric techniques such as instrumental 
variables to attempt to control for demand shocks when estimating the 
investment demand equation, with varying degrees of success.  
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The methodology for the identification of R&D investment equations is 
based on a simple supply and demand heuristic, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
The curve sloping downward to the right represents the demand for 
R&D investment funds and the curves sloping upward the supply of 
funds. Internal funds are available at a constant cost of capital until they 
are exhausted, at which point it becomes necessary to issue debt or equity 
in order to finance more investment. When the demand curve cuts the 
supply curve in the horizontal portion, a shock that increases cash flow 
(and shifts supply outward) has no effect on the level of investment.  
However, if the demand curve cuts the supply curve where it is 
upward sloping, it is possible for a shock to cash flow to shift the supply 
curve out in such a way as to induce a substantial increase in R&D 
investment. Figure 2 illustrates such a case, where the firm shifts from 
point A to point B in response to a cash flow shock that does not shift the 
demand curve.  
Figure 1 - Financially Unconstrained Firm 
Figure 1
Unconstrained Firm
0
1.2
0 10
R&D Investment
R
a
te
 o
f 
re
tu
rn
/C
o
s
t 
o
f 
fu
n
d
s
cost of 
internal 
funds
Demand for funds
Supply of funds
Supply of funds shifted out
A, B
Bronwyn H. Hall: The Financing of Innovative Firms 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/4 14 
During the past several years, various versions of these methodologies 
have been applied to data on the R&D investment of US, U.K., French, 
German, Irish, and Japanese firms and possibly others. The firms 
examined are typically the largest and most important manufacturing 
firms in their economy. For example, Hall (1992) found a large positive 
elasticity between R&D and cash flow, using an accelerator-type model 
and a very large sample of US manufacturing firms. The estimation 
methodology here controlled for both firm effects and simultaneity. 
Similarly and using some of the same data, Himmelberg and Petersen 
(1994) looked at a panel of 179 US small firms in high-tech industries and 
found an economically large and statistically significant relationship 
between R&D investment and internal finance. 
More recently, J. Brown et al. (2009) have shown that both cash flow 
and the issuance of public equity are very important for younger US firms 
during the period 1990-2004, while they have little impact on mature 
firms’ R&D investment. They focus on the high-technology sector (drugs, 
office and computing equipment, communications equipment, electronic 
components, scientific instruments, medical instruments, and software), 
which accounts for almost all of the increase in R&D during this period, 
and use Euler-equation methods with fixed firm effects and industry-level 
year dummies to remove most of the variation due to unobserved 
Figure 2 - Financially Constrained Firm 
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differences in firm characteristics and demand shocks across industry7. A 
novel finding in this paper and a companion paper by J. Brown and 
Petersen (2009) is the increased importance of public-equity issuance in 
financing R&D in the United States, which doubtless reflects a shift in 
expectations on the part of investors during this period that lowered the 
cost of this kind of capital to the firm.  
Harhoff (1998) found weak but significant cash-flow effects on R&D for 
both small and large German firms, although Euler-equation estimates for 
R&D investment were uninformative due to the smoothness of R&D and 
the small sample size. Combining limited survey evidence with his 
regression results, he concludes that R&D investment in small German 
firms may be constrained by the availability of finance. Bond et al. (1999) 
find significant differences between the cash flow impacts on R&D and 
investment for large manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom and 
Germany. German firms in their sample are insensitive to cash flow 
shocks, whereas the investment of non-R&D-doing UK firms does 
respond. Cash flow helps to predict whether a UK firm does R&D, but not 
the level of that R&D. They interpret their findings to mean that financial 
constraints are important for British firms, but that those which do R&D 
are a self-selected group that face fewer constraints. This is consistent with 
the view that the desire of firms to smooth R&D over time combines with 
the relatively high cost of financing it to reduce R&D well below the level 
that would obtain in a frictionless world. That is, some firms do not find it 
worthwhile to begin an R&D program that they expect will have to be 
curtailed in the future due to financial constraints.  
Mulkay et al. (2001) perform a similar exercise using large French and 
US manufacturing firms, finding that cash-flow impacts are much larger 
in the US than in France, both for R&D and for ordinary investment. 
Except for the well-known fact that R&D exhibits higher serial correlation 
than investment (presumably because of higher adjustment costs), 
differences in behaviour are between countries, not between investment 
types, suggesting that they are due to differences in the structure of 
financial markets rather than the type of investment, tangible or 
intangible. This result is consistent with evidence reported in Hall et al. 
(1999) for the US, France, and Japan during an earlier time period, which 
basically finds that R&D and investment on the one hand, and sales and 
cash flow on the other, are simultaneously determined in the United States 
                                                 
7 The Euler equation for investment is an equilibrium condition derived from the firm’s 
value maximization problem. It expresses the tradeoff between investing today and 
having one more period of production from the capital versus investing tomorrow and 
forgoing today’s production.  
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(neither one “Granger-causes” the other)8. In the other countries, however, 
both types of investment are causal for sales and cash flow, with little 
feedback from sales and cash flows to the two types of investments. Using 
a non-structural R&D investment equation together with data for the US, 
UK, Canada, Europe, and Japan, Bhagat and Welch (1995) found similar 
results for the 1985-1990 period, with stock returns predicting changes in 
R&D more strongly for the US and UK firms. Thus in all the countries 
studied, R&D investment is a predictor of increased performance 
contemporaneously (measured as sales, cash flow, or stock returns), 
whereas in the US and the UK, there is immediate feedback from the 
performance measures to R&D investment, which can be due either to 
liquidity effects or the positive demand signal from increased sales or cash 
flow.  
Bougheas et al. (2001) examine the effects of liquidity constraints on 
R&D investment using firm-level data for manufacturing firms in Ireland 
and also find evidence that R&D investment in these firms is financially 
constrained, in line with the previous studies of US and UK firms. 
4.2 Studies Using Innovation-Survey Data 
Recently a number of authors, mostly in Europe, have combined 
innovation survey data and firm financial data in order to look more 
closely at the relationship between innovative activities and the presence 
of financial constraints. This endeavour is welcome given the fact that the 
prior work was confined only to R&D investment, but it has suffered to 
some extent from the fact that in order for a firm to experience financial 
constraints related to innovation, they must at least want to be an 
innovator, leading to substantial simultaneity between the two9. Various 
approaches are taken to mitigate this problem in the studies described 
below.  
Savignac (2008) and Hajivassiliou and Savignac (2008) examine a 
simultaneous model of the two discrete states (facing financial constraints 
and innovating) directly, using a large sample of French firms. They do 
indeed find simultaneity between the two: binding financing constraints 
discourage innovation and at the same time innovative firms are more 
likely to face binding financing constraints. Using data on UK firms, 
Canepa and Stoneman (2008) find that the cost and availability of finance 
                                                 
8 Granger causality is a definition of causality in a time-series context that is due to the 
late Clive Granger. One variable “Granger-causes” another if its prior values but not its 
current values help to predict the variable in the presence of the variable’s own history.  
9 This difficulty is compounded by the fact that the skip patterns in some versions of the 
innovation surveys mean that non-innovating firms are never asked whether they faced 
financial constraints that prevented them from innovating.  
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matters for innovation, especially for high-technology firms and for the 
smaller firms in their sample.  
W. Brown (1997) argues that existing tests of the impact of capital 
market imperfections on innovative firms cannot distinguish between two 
possibilities: (i) capital markets are perfect and different factors drive the 
firm's different types of expenditure or (ii) capital markets are imperfect 
and different types of expenditure react differently to a common factor 
(shocks to the supply of internal finance). He then compares the sensitivity 
of investment to cash flow for innovative and non-innovative firms in the 
UK. The results support the hypothesis that capital markets are imperfect, 
finding that the investment of innovative firms is more sensitive to cash 
flow.  
Magri (2009) also compares the cash flow sensitivity of innovative and 
non-innovative firms, this time for Italian firms. She finds that investment 
in small innovative firms is more sensitive to cash flow than in small non-
innovative firms, but that there is no difference for large firms. Note that 
this analysis is for ordinary investment rather than for innovation 
investment itself, but it is still suggestive of financial constraints for 
smaller innovating firms.  
Jensen and Webster (2009) look at the cyclical response to macro-
economic conditions of success in commercialization of new products and 
services by Australian firms. The most important macro-economic 
determinant of success is the cost of bank overdrafts (lower is better, 
obviously), followed by the interest rate, and the cost of R&D. In general, 
commercial success is pro-cyclical in their sample, although others have 
found some evidence that research itself (as opposed to development) is 
counter-cyclical.  
4.3 Corporate-Governance Structure and the Financing of 
R&D 
The challenge for direct tests of the relationship between management 
and ownership structures and firm investment strategies is that in any 
given firm, the two have co-evolved to be adapted to one another, and 
therefore observed correlations do not admit much of a causal story. In 
particular, any attempt to look at variations in performance that result 
from variations in strategy and governance will struggle with the fact that 
selection for “fitness” tends to eliminate some of the experiments one 
might like to see.  
The usual way around this problem is to look for announcement effects, 
that is, for market reaction to information surprises or news that firms 
have not yet adapted to. The event study methodology is described in 
detail in Campbell et al. (1997). Briefly, it involves computing the returns 
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to an investor from holding a share of stock in a firm during the 3 to 5 day 
period around the time that some news that affects the firm is revealed 
publicly. The returns computed are “abnormal,” that is, they are adjusted 
for the overall market returns during the same period.  
Both Alam and Walton (1995) and Zantout (1997) find higher abnormal 
returns to firm shares following new debt issues when the firm is more 
R&D-intensive. The argument is that the acquisition of new sources of 
financing is good news when the firm has an asymmetric-information 
problem because of its R&D strategy. Similarly, Szewczyk et al. (1996) find 
that investment opportunities (as proxied by Tobin’s q) explain R&D-
associated abnormal returns, and that these returns are higher when the 
firm is highly leveraged, implying a higher required rate of return for debt 
finance in equilibrium. Of course, in both of these cases, the evidence is 
non-experimental and the links between the theory and the empirical tests 
somewhat tenuous, but the results are suggestive. 
Evidence on the importance of agency costs as they relate to R&D takes 
several forms. Several researchers have studied the impact of anti-
takeover amendments (which arguably increase managerial security and 
willingness to take on risk while reducing managerial discipline) on R&D 
investment and firm value. Johnston and Rao (1997) find that such 
amendments are not followed by cuts in R&D, while Pugh et al. (1999) 
find that adoption of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), which is 
a form of anti-takeover protection, is followed by R&D increases. Cho 
(1992) finds that R&D intensity increases with the share that managerial 
shareholdings represent of the manager’s wealth and interprets this as 
incentive pay mitigating agency costs and inducing long-term investment.  
Some have argued that institutional ownership of the managerial firm 
can be conducive to more R&D by reducing the agency costs due to free-
riding by owners that is a feature of the governance of firms with diffuse 
ownership structure. Others however have held that such ownership pays 
too much attention to short-term earnings and therefore discourages long-
term investment10.  
There is some limited evidence that this may indeed be the case. Eng 
and Shackell (2001) find that firms adopting long-term performance plans 
for their managers do not increase their R&D spending but that 
institutional ownership is associated with higher R&D. In addition, R&D-
performing firms tend not to be held by banks and insurance companies, 
at least in the US These types of firms are presumed to be poor at 
monitoring R&D performance. Majumdar and Nagarajan (1997) find that 
                                                 
10 Institutions such as mutual and pension funds often control somewhat larger blocks of 
shares than individuals, making monitoring firm and manager behaviour a more 
effective and more rewarding activity for these organizations. 
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high institutional-investor ownership does not lead to short-term 
behaviour on the part of the firm; in particular, it does not lead to cuts in 
R&D spending. Francis and Smith (1995) find that diffusely held firms are 
less innovative, implying that monitoring alleviates agency costs and 
enables investment in innovation.  
In a study of German manufacturing firms, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) 
use patent data as an indicator of innovative activity and find the opposite 
result. Companies with dispersed ownership are more active in 
innovation as measured by patent applications, but patenting falls as 
leverage increases. They interpret this result as suggesting that leverage 
acts as a disciplinary device that restrains overinvestment by managers. 
Although they attempt to control for the endogeneity of leverage using 
instrumental variables, the instruments (lagged cash flow and tangible-
asset intensity) are arguably also related to unobserved determinants of 
innovative activity; in the absence of independent measures of over- or 
under-investment, it is difficult to know whether leverage is a discipline 
device or merely an indicator that the firm is not as innovation intensive 
as some others. 
In general, the evidence summarized above is fairly clear and indicates 
that long term incentives for managers can encourage R&D and that 
institutional ownership does not necessarily discourage R&D investment. 
However, it is fairly silent on the magnitude of these effects, and whether 
these governance features truly close the agency cost-induced gap 
between the cost of capital and the return to R&D. 
4.4 Capital Structure and R&D 
Another way to look at the financing-innovation nexus is to examine 
the capital structure that results from the financing decisions of R&D-
intensive firms. Here the evidence that debt is disfavoured is quite clear. 
Work using US data such as Friend and Lang (1988) and Hall (1992) shows 
a clear negative correlation between R&D intensity and leverage. The 
same is true of unpublished results for European firms (Hall et al., 2009).  
Although leverage may be a useful tool for reducing agency costs in the 
firm, it is of limited value for R&D-intensive firms. As discussed above, 
because the knowledge asset created by R&D investment is intangible, 
partly embedded in human capital, and ordinarily very specialized to the 
particular firm in which it resides, the capital structure of R&D-intensive 
firms customarily exhibits considerably less leverage than that of other 
firms. Banks and other debt holders prefer to use physical assets to secure 
loans and are reluctant to lend when the project involves substantial R&D 
investment rather than investment in plant and equipment. In the words 
of Williamson (1988), “redeployable” assets (that is, assets whose value in 
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an alternative use is almost as high as in their current use) are more suited 
to the governance structures associated with debt. Additional empirical 
support for this idea is provided by Alderson and Betker (1996), who find 
that liquidation costs and R&D are positively related across firms. The 
implication is that the sunk costs associated with R&D investment are 
higher than that for ordinary investment. 
In addition, servicing debt usually requires a stable source of cash flow, 
which makes it more difficult to find the funds for an R&D investment 
program that must be sustained at a certain level in order to be 
productive. For both these reasons, firms are either unable or reluctant to 
use debt finance for R&D investment, which may raise the cost of capital, 
depending on the precise tax treatment of debt versus equity. Confirming 
empirical evidence for the idea that limiting free cash flow in R&D firms 
by issuing debt is a less desirable method of reducing agency costs is 
provided by Chung and Wright (1998), who find that financial slack and 
R&D spending are positively correlated with the value of growth firms, 
but not correlated with that of other firms. Czarnitzki and Kraft (2009) find 
that more leveraged German firms have lower innovation output 
(measured by patents), especially when ownership of the firm is 
dispersed. 
In the view of some observers, the LBO wave of the 1980s in the United 
States and the United Kingdom arose partly because high real interest 
rates meant that there were strong pressures to eliminate free cash flow 
within firms (Blair and Litan, 1990). For firms in industries where R&D is 
an important form of investment, such pressure should have been reduced 
by the need for internal funds to undertake such investment and indeed 
Hall (1993, 1994) and Opler and Titman (1993) find that firms with high 
R&D intensity were much less likely to do an LBO. Opler and Titman 
(1994) find that R&D firms that were leveraged suffered more than other 
firms when facing economic distress, presumably because leverage meant 
that they were unable to sustain R&D programs in the face of reduced 
cash flow.  
In related work using data on Israeli firms, Blass and Yosha (2003) 
report that R&D-intensive firms listed on the US stock exchanges use 
highly equity-based sources of financing, whereas those listed only in 
Israel rely more on bank financing and government funding. The former 
are more profitable and faster-growing, which suggests that the choice of 
where to list the shares and whether to finance with new equity is indeed 
sensitive to the expected rate of return to the R&D being undertaken. That 
is, investors supplying arms-length finance require higher returns to 
compensate them for the risk of a “lemon”. 
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4.5 Young Innovative Companies 
Before leaving this topic, I briefly review the evidence on the financing 
of young innovative firms and start-ups. At the macro-economic level and 
beginning with Rajan and Zingales (1998), a number of studies have 
related the overall financial development level with measures such as the 
entry of new firms in a country. Using a set of 16 countries including the 
US, European, and mid-level developing countries in Eastern Europe and 
Latin America, Aghion et al. (2007) show that the level of financial 
development in a country (private credit and the size of market 
capitalization) strongly influences entry and post-entry growth of small 
firms but has little impact on large-firm growth.  
These authors highlight the differences in the level of market 
capitalization between the US, the U.K., and a few Nordic countries on the 
one hand and continental Europe on the other. Although to some extent 
the growth of small firms and stock markets are endogenously related in 
that they grow together, the methodologies chosen by Rajan-Zingales and 
Aghion et al. are designed to minimize the identification problem that 
results, which makes their results robust. This work does not relate 
directly to innovative firms per se, but it is suggestive, as these are often 
very prominent among new firms, especially in the manufacturing sectors 
that are studied by these authors.  
An entirely different approach that looks directly at the cash flow 
impact on entrepreneurial firms was pursued by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994). 
Using tax data on US entrepreneurs (sole proprietors) some of whom 
received inheritances, they were able to show that the reception of funds 
from inheritance increased entrepreneurial survival and that those that 
survived grew faster, suggesting that such firms were financially 
constrained prior to the cash influx. Turning to R&D-doing and innovative 
small firms in particular, in most of the work reviewed in section 4.1, 
when the authors have looked have found greater financial constraints for 
these firms than for the larger firms in their samples. For examples, see 
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) and Brown et al. (2009).  
Of course, looking at smaller firms that have successfully entered but 
face some financial constraints is only part of the story. We would also like 
to know about entry that never takes place, or failure to innovate due to 
constraints. Here the innovation surveys can be helpful, especially if they 
survey non-innovative firms carefully. For example, Canepa and 
Stoneman (2008) found that finance mattered especially for the smaller 
innovative firms in their UK sample, as does Magri (2008) for Italian firms. 
Audretsch and Lehmann (2004) examined the financing of young 
innovative firms on the German Neuer Markt, finding a negative 
correlation between bank debt and venture capital financing. They also 
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show that the VC-backed firms have much higher growth rates. They 
argue that these two findings show the importance of financiers willing to 
risk capital for the success of young innovative firms, especially in a 
country like Germany where bank finance dominates.  
5 Conclusions and Policy Implications  
A number of conclusions have emerged from this body of theoretical 
and empirical work, conclusions that are fairly consistent across the 
various samples and methodological variations. It is perhaps important to 
emphasize that the market failures catalogued and explored here are 
confined to those due to the separation of owner and manager, or 
financier and entrepreneur. However, the principle public policy 
argument for subsidizing innovative firms may be different, as it is based 
on the social benefits to be derived from the unpriced knowledge 
spillovers from such firms. That is, the problem of inappropriability of the 
returns to investment in knowledge that was pointed out long ago by 
Arrow (1962) and Nelson (1959). The arguments and evidence here are in 
addition to these.  
First, there is solid evidence that debt is a disfavoured source of finance 
for R&D investment. Second, the “Anglo-Saxon” economies, with their 
thick and highly developed stock markets and relatively transparent 
ownership structures, typically exhibit more sensitivity and 
responsiveness of R&D to cash flow than continental economies. Third, 
and much more speculatively, this greater responsiveness may arise 
because they are financially constrained, in the sense that they view 
external sources of finance as much more costly than internal, and 
therefore require a considerably higher rate of return to investments done 
on the margin when they are tapping these sources. However, it is 
perhaps equally likely that this responsiveness occurs because firms are 
more sensitive to demand signals in thick financial equity markets; a 
definitive explanation of the “excess sensitivity” result awaits further 
research.  
Finally, there is now considerable evidence that young and/or small 
firms are more likely to face financial constraints than large established 
firms, a result that is not surprising, if the source of the problem is a 
“lemons” premium. Presumably such firms have a weaker track record on 
which investors can base their evaluations. 
There are a number of policy implications from the results discussed in 
this paper. One implication is for governments to design policies 
conducive to lowering the cost of financing innovation, which many 
governments have done. The chief instrument in this area is a simple tax 
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credit or subsidy, in some cases targeted towards small firms. Others 
include various programmes that are project related or targeted towards 
pre-commercial research and development (e.g., see David et al., 2000) for 
an international survey of this literature; Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004) 
for a detailed study of R&D subsidies in Germany; and Hall and Maffioli 
(2008) for a survey of such programs in Latin America and their 
evaluation).  
One of the problems in designing policy in this area is that different 
countries face different problems. For example, although one can argue 
that financing constraints are not absent in the United States, it is fairly 
clear that the rise of the VC industry has mitigated the problem, at least 
for high technology start-ups (including those in green technologies). In 
other countries, creating such an industry may be more of a challenge. In 
Israel, for example, it appears to have been kick-started successfully by the 
government, but only on the second try (Gilson 2003; Avnimelech and 
Teubal, 2004).  
Several European governments have also attempted to behave 
somewhat as VCs towards their own start-ups and small innovative firms. 
In Germany, more than 800 federal and state government financing 
programs have been established for new firms in the recent past (OECD 
1995). In 1980, the Swedish government established the first of a series of 
investment companies (along with instituting a series of measures such as 
reduced capital-gains taxes to encourage private investment in start-ups), 
partly on the United States model. By 1987, the government share of 
venture capital funding was 43 percent (Karaomerliolu and Jacobsson, 
1999). Recently, the UK has instituted a series of government programs 
under the Enterprise Fund umbrella which allocate funds to small and 
medium-sized firms in high technology and certain regions, as well as 
guaranteeing some loans to small businesses (Bank of England, 2001).  
In a recent theoretical paper, Takalo and Tanayama (2008) argue that 
government R&D subsidies based on screening of firms and projects can 
serve as important signals to private-equity markets and venture 
capitalists of the quality of the recipients, which will reduce to some extent 
the “lemons” premium demanded by non-government investors. Lerner 
(1999) studied US recipients of Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
grants and concluded the same: Receiving such a grant enabled firms to 
obtain more resources elsewhere, and in addition such firms grew faster 
afterwards, when compared to a matched sample of firms that did not 
receive funds from SBIR. This suggests an important role for government 
policy in screening firms for funding.  
For established firms, estimates of cash-flow sensitivity point to 
differences between the US and UK on the one hand and continental 
European countries on the other, with the former more sensitive than the 
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latter, so in principle US and UK firms should be more subject to financial 
constraints. But there is little evidence that this leads to lower innovative 
activity, in fact somewhat the contrary, so other forces must be at work, 
too. The largest of these firms in all countries and the ones that perform 
the greatest amount of R&D tend to compete with each other in 
international markets, so that it is not likely that the behaviour of firms 
from different countries can diverge too far.  
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